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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NEGATIVE
COUNTERVAILING DUTY DETERMINATIONS:
UNITED STATES V ZENITH RADIO CORP.
The Trade Act of 19741 amends the Tariff Act of 19302 to provide for
judicial review of negative countervailing duty 3 determinations. This new
right to judicial review, embodied in section 516(d) of the Tariff Act,4 ap-
plies to determinations made by the Secretary of the Treasury under section
303 of the Tariff Act.5 The first case to arise under section 516(d) involving
1. Pub. L. No. 98-618, § 321(f)(1), 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (amending TariffAct of 1930, ch.
497, tit. IV, § 516, 46 Stat. 590).
The Trade Act of 1974 made other significant changes in the countervailing duty law. See
generally Comment, United States Countervailing Duty Law: Renewed, Revamped and Revir-
ited-Trade Act of.1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 832, 852-63 (1976).
2. Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 [hereinafter cited as Tariff Act].
3. A countervailing duty is a special or additional duty imposed on imported merchandise
to offset a subsidy paid by the exporting country upon exportation. The general purpose of a
countervailing duty is to preserve free trade and competition between domestic and imported
merchandise by neutralizing the competitive advantage accorded foreign goods by such subsi-
dies. See Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidizatiorn 4 Re-emerging Issue in Inter-
national Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 83 (1969).
4. Tariff Act of 1930, § 516(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976). Section 516(d) of the Tariff
Act as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976), states in pertinent part:
(d) Within 30 days after a determination by the Secretary-
(2) under section 303 of this Act, that a bounty or grant is not being paid or be-
stowed, an American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler of merchandise of the
same class or kind as that described in such determination may file with the Secretary
a written notice of a desire to contest such determination. Upon receipt of such notice
the Secretary shall cause publication to be made thereof and of such manufacturer's,
producer's, or wholesaler's desire to contest the determination. Within 30 days after
such publication, such manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler may commence an ac-
tion in the United States Customs Court contesting such determination.
5. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976). Section 303 of the Tariff Act as
amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976), states in pertinent part:
(a)(1) Whenever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political
subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation,
shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacture
or production or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in
such country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of govern-
ment, then upon the importation of such article or merchandise into the United States,
whether the same shall be imported directly from the country of production or other-
wise, and whether such article or merchandise is imported in the same condition as
when exported from the country of production or has been changed in condition by
remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases, in addi-
tion to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or
grant, however the same be paid or bestowed.
Although private subsidies have been included within the purview of § 303 since 1922, no
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a negative countervailing duty determination is United States v. Zenith Ra-
dio Corp.6 In Zenith, an American manufacturer challenged a Treasury de-
termination not to assess countervailing duties against certain imported
Japanese electronic products, upon which the Japanese Government had
remitted a domestic excise tax. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA) decision in Zenith resolves the controversy in favor of the Treasury
Department, reflecting extraordinary judicial deference to the Treasury's
interpretation of section 303.7 The court's approach creates substantial
doubt as to the viability of the new section 516(d) right to judicial review of
negative countervailing duty determinations.
After tracing the conflict between administrative practice and judicial de-
cisions that culminated in the Zenith controversy, this Note will consider
whether the CCPA failed to fulfill its responsibility under section 516(d) to
scrutinize the Treasury determination. Alternatives will then be explored
which remain available to American manufacturers who, after Zenith, ap-
pear to be without effective judicial recourse from unfavorable Treasury
determinations.
I
TREATMENT OF EXCISE TAX REMISSSION UNDER
U.S. COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
A. TREASURY PRACTICE
Treasury policy concerning the remission of excise taxes originated with
an 1898 Treasury decision involving allegations that exporters of French
chestnuts had received "a drawback of 50 centimes (one-half franc) per
kilo" from the French Government.8 The decision established a blanket
rule that "the noncollection of an internal revenue tax by the exporting
country does not constitute an export bounty."9 However, "excessive" re-
missions-payments in excess of the tax originally imposed-are subject to
claim against an alleged private subsidy has ever arisen under the statute. This fact provides a
useful rule for distinguishing between countervailing duty cases and those arising under the
closely related Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-173 (1976): cases treated under the An-
tidumping Act involve unfair international trade practices of private interests, while those
under countervailing duty law always involve governmental subsidies. See Feller, Mutiny
Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax Adustments, and the Resurgence
ofthe Countervailing Duty Law, 1 LAW & POL'Y INV'L Bus. 17, 33 (1969). Congress has en-
trusted enforcement of the countervailing duty statute to the Secretary of the Treasury, who
determines whether or not various export schemes of foreign governments constitute bounties
or grants under § 303.
6. 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1978)
(No. 77-539).
7. Id. at 1218-23.
8. T.D. 19321, 1 TREAS. DEc. 696 (1898).
9. Id. at 696.
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countervailing duties.10
Attempts to determine the Department's rationale for this rule founder
on the most recurrent problem in the area of countervailing duty law:
Treasury secrecy."I Neither section 303 nor the Customs Service regulations
on countervailing duty investigations 12 contain a provision requiring the
Treasury to explain its determinations. Furthermore, the Treasury has not
officially enumerated the types of practices that are subject to counter-
vailing duties, although commentators have attempted to construct lists
based on the skeletal decisions published by the Treasury.13 Even these
lists, however, do not specify which practices the Treasury considers clearly
outside the scope of section 303, since prior to the enactment of the Trade
Act of 1974 the Department was not required to publish its negative deter-
minations.14
At least in the early stages of a countervailing duty investigation, Trea-
sury secrecy is not entirely without justification. Any determination under
the statute, whether positive or negative, could have a substantial impact on
international trade,' 5 and premature disclosure could hinder negotiations
aimed at resolving the dispute by international agreement.' 6 Another
justification for the Treasury's secrecy might be the tremendous complexity
of the issues involved. 17 Neither of these reasons, however, adequately jus-
tifies continued secrecy after the termination of a particular countervailing
duty investigation. Not surprisingly, commentators have frequently criti-
cized the Treasury's secrecy,' 8 and a congressional subcommittee has ex-
pressed concern that this practice inhibits analysis of Treasury
interpretations of the law.' 9 Critics have suggested forcing disclosure of
10. Id. at 696-97. For later applications of this standard, see, for example, T.D. 31659, 20
TREAs. DEC. 67 (1911); T.D. 49355, 73 TREAs. DEC. 107 (1938).
11. Lamenting the failure of Congress to require Treasury explication of its countervailing
duty decisions, one commentator stated: "The continuation of this practice will hinder, as pre-
viously, both those seeking a clear understanding of administrative construction of the phrase,
as well as those who seek to support or protest particular Treasury determinations in an intelli-
gent manner." Comment, supra note 1, at 864 (footnotes omitted).
12. 19 C.F.R. § 159.47 (1977).
13. One writer, a Treasury official, lists eight such categories. See Feller, supra note 5, at
40-50.
14. The Treasury had published only one negative countervailing duty determination prior
to 1974. See T.D. 67-142, 1 Cust. B. & Dec. 292 (1967).
15. See, e.g., note 84 infra.
16. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Automotive Parts, Jan. 16-Mar. 9, 1965, United States-
Canada, 17 U.S.T. 1372, T.I.A.S. No. 6093. This Agreement was the product of informal nego-
tiations while a countervailing duty investigation was pending on the issue. See Butler, supra
note 3, at 131-32.
17. Butler, supra note 3, at 125.
18. See, e.g., id., at 131-33; Comment, supra note 1, at 864.
19. In "[t]he absence of any reports from the Treasury Department as to the basis on which
its determinations of the existence of subsidization are made, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
analyze the administration of section 303." SUBCOMM. ON CusToMs, TARIFFS AND RECIPRO-
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Treasury reasoning under the Freedom of Information Act,20 but appar-
ently this has not been tried.2 1
The Treasury's refusal to explain its decisions under section 303 would be
relatively unimportant if the principles involved were simple and invari-
able. Unfortunately, the opposite is true. For example, although the gen-
eral rule is that remission of internal revenue taxes is not countervailable, in
1967 the Treasury countervailed against remission of certain Italian inter-
nal revenue taxes on the export of electrical transmission towers. 22 Predict-
ably, the Treasury published its determination with no explanation. The
importer in American Express Co. v. United States23 challenged the order in
the Customs Court, which affirmed the Treasury's finding. The importer
then appealed to the CCPA, where the Department's rationale for the im-
position of countervailing duties finally surfaced. In a stipulation, the par-
ties agreed that section 303 would apply to "the remission, rebate, refund,
or abatement, however accomplished, of taxes or other charges which are
not directly relatedto the exportedproduct or to the raw materials or compo-
nents used therein." 24
The adoption of this refinement of the Treasury rule--distinguishing be-
tween taxes imposed directly upon the product itself and all other
taxes-brings Treasury practice into line with the international standard
embodied in the GATT,25 which exempts from countervailing duty liability
CA. TRADE AGREEMENTS, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 85TH CONG., IST SEss., RE-
PORT ON UNITED STATES CUSTOMS, TARIFF AND TRADE AGREEMENT LAWS AND THEIR
ADMINISTRATION 95 (1957).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
21. See Comment, supra note 1, at 839 n.66.
Critics of Treasury secrecy did win a major victory upon the enactment of an amendment to
the Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-173 (1976), in the Trade Act of 1974. As amended,
the Antidumping Act requires the Treasury to publish along with its determinations in an-
tidumping investigations "a complete statement of findings and conclusions, and the reasons
or bases therefor, on all the mateial issues of fact or law presented." Id. at § 160(d)(2). Al-
though this disclosure requirement was not specifically added to the countervailing duty stat-
ute, some commentators were optimistic that disclosure would be extended to countervailing
duty determinations as well as antidumping investigations. See, e.g., Remarks by Eugene
Stewart, before the Third Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, American Manufacturer's Contest ofTreasury Decision Not to Assess Coun-
tervailing orAntidumping Duties (May 10, 1976), reprinted in 72 F.R.D. 397, 410. However,
the Treasury has refused to extend its disclosure obligation to its reasoning in countervailing
duty cases.
22. T.D. 67-102, 1 Cust. B. & Dec. 212 (1967). The remitted taxes had been imposed on
such general overhead items as factory machinery, registration taxes, etc.
23. 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973), aft'g 332 F. Supp. 191 (Cust. Ct. 1971).
24. Id. at 1057 (emphasis added).
25. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5 at All,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. GATT is a multilateral
agreement concerning international trade policy. See generally K. DAM, THE GATT-LAw
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970).
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remission of "duties or taxes borne by the ... product."2 6 The United
States is not legally bound to follow the GATT rule because of its grand-
father clause, exempting contracting parties from compliance if prior incon-
sistent domestic legislation exists.27 Nonetheless, reference to the
international practice does help to clarify the Treasury's interpretation of
section 303.
B. CONFLICTING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: DowNs AND NICHOLAS
The longstanding Treasury interpretation of section 303 not to counter-
vail against the remission of excise taxes does not accord with the language
in several Supreme Court cases, the most important of which is Downs v.
United States.28 Downs involved a scheme of the Russian Government to
regulate the internal price of sugar, by which exporters received a remission
of the Russian excise tax on sugar as well as a transferable export certifi-
cate. The value of the certificate was determined by the difference between
the domestic and foreign market prices of sugar at the time of export. The
Supreme Court held that this arrangement bestowed a bounty upon expor-
tation, stating in broad language that the mere remission of the excise tax
was per se a bounty or grant:
The details of this elaborate procedure for the production, sale, taxation,
and exportation of Russian sugar are of much less importance than the two
facts which appear clearly through this maze of regulations, viz.: that no
sugar is permitted to be sold in Russia that does not pay an excise tax of R.
1.75 per pood, and that sugar exported pays no tax at all .... When a tax is
imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted upon all sugar exported,
then, by whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under whatever name it
is disguised, it is a bounty upon exportation.29
Although this language would conclusively resolve the question of excise
tax remission if clearly a part of the Downs holding, the precedential value
26. GAIT, supra note 25, art. VI(3), 61 Stat. pt. 5 at A24. This article states:
No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping or countervailing duty by
reason of the exemption of such product from duties or taxes borne by the like product
when destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of
the refund of such duties or taxes.
Because GATT follows the "country of destination" principle to avoid double taxation of
internationally traded goods, the GATT rule allows remission of indirect taxes such as excise
taxes. Rosendahl, Border Tax Adjuistments: .Problems and Proposals, 2 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L
Bus. 85, 90 (1970). On the other hand, remission of direct taxes, such as income taxes, is
countervailable. The rationale for the difference in treatment rests on the assumption that di-
rect taxes are ultimately shifted backward to the producer, whereas indirect taxes are shifted
entirely forward to the consumer. Id.
27. GATT, supra note 25, Protocol of Provisional Application, 61 Stat. pt. 6 at A2051.
28. 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
29. Id. at 515.
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of the case is disputed.30 The Treasury has consistently ignored Downs,
contending that the Supreme Court's language concerning excise tax remis-
sion is mere dictum. 31 The opinions of the lower courts in Downs do little to
resolve the ambiguity of the Supreme Court opinion,32 making the Trea-
sury's argument difficult to confirm or refute.33
The other major Supreme Court case on tax remission is Nicholas & Co.
v. United States.34 This case involved a countervailing duty assessment
against spirits imported from the United Kingdom, whose manufacturers
had received both remission of an internal excise tax and an additional "al-
lowance" upon export. 35 The Nicholas Court gave as an example of an in-
direct bounty "the remission of taxes upon the exportation of articles which
are subject to a tax when sold or consumed in the country of their produc-
tion," and cited Downs.3 6 Further, the Court broadly interpreted the word
"grant" in section 303.37 Nonetheless, the specific issue of tax remission
apparently was not before the Court, again raising the question of whether
the Court's discussion was dictum.38
30. The Supreme Court in Downs showed some confusion even as to the precise issue before
it, giving the tax remission issue only scant treatment while focusing most of its attention on
the export certificate. Id. at 512-15.
31. See Butler, supra note 3, at 120.
32. For example, the Board of General Appraisers held that the Russian Government be-
stowed a bounty by remitting taxes and by issuing the export certificate. T.D. 22984, 4 TREAs.
DEC. 405 (1901). The court of appeals incorporated the Board of Appraisers' opinion as part
of its own, Downs v. United States, 133 F. 144, 151-52 (4th Cir. 1902), but at the same time
concluded that the bounty consisted only of the export certificate. Id. at 145.
33. Many commentators have argued that the language in Downs is dictum. One such
argument relies on the value of the export certificate and the excise tax remission. See Recent
Decision, The Michelin Decision"A Possible New Direction for U.S. Countervailing Duty Law,
6 LAW & PoI'Y INt'L Bus. 237, 245 (1974). The excise tax of R. 1.75 per pood was fully
remitted under the Russian scheme. The market value of the export certificate was between
R. 1.25-1.64 per pood. Thus, if the remission of the excise tax was at issue, the countervailing
duty levied "would necessarily have had to exceed 1.75 rubles, the normal excise tax." Id.
Since, however, the amount levied was only .38-.50 rubles per pood, the tax remission issue
must not have been before the Court, and the tax remission language must be dictum. Id.
The problem with this argument is that the amount finally countervailed as the "net" bounty
corresponds neither to the value of the tax remission nor to the value of the export certificate.
The Treasury's basis for determining the net bounty was not disclosed, so that what was con-
sidered to be the "gross" bounty-whether consisting of one or both elements-is not ascer-
tainable. See Butler, supra note 3, at 119; notes 62-66 infra and accompanying text.
34. 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
,35. Id. at 36.
36. Id. at 41.
37. "Like its synonyms 'give' and 'bestow,' ['grant'] expresses a concession, the conferring of
something by one person upon another. And if the 'something' be conferred by a country
'upon the exportation of any article or merchandise' a countervailing duty is required .
Id. at 39.
38. The lower court in Nicholas stated: "It must be borne in mind that this appeal concerns
only the 'allowance' paid exporters of 3d. and 5d. and not the excise duty of 14s.9d, which
latter is never paid upon spirits exported from the United Kingdom of Great Britain. The
CO UNTER VAILING DUTIES
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NEGATIVE COUNTERVAILING DUTY
DETERMINATIONS
The conflict between the administrative interpretation of section 303 and
the judicial interpretation espoused in Downs and Nicholas remained un-
resolved through successive reenactments of the statute by Congress.39
American manufacturers competing with subsidized imports might have
tried to bring the controversy to a head, but were hindered by Treasury
secrecy4° and by Treasury delays in pursuing countervailing duty investiga-
tions.41
An additional problem arose in 1971 with the CCPA's decision in United
States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc.42 that American manufacturers
were not entitled to judicial review of negative countervailing duty determi-
nations. The CCPA based the Hammond Lead decision on its reading of
section 516(b) of the Tariff Act,43 which provides for judicial review of
Treasury determinations on the "classification of and the rate of duty" im-
posed on imported merchandise. A countervailing duty, according to the
court, was a "penal exaction" and not a "duty" within the meaning of the
statute.44 As an alternative holding, the court indicated at length that coun-
tervailing duty assessments are "not essentially judicial in nature" 45 and
status of the latter is not here in question." Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust. App.
97, 104 (1916).
39. For a more comprehensive treatment of the legislative evolution of the countervailing
duty law, see Comment, supra note 1, at 833-63.
40. See notes 11-21 supra and accompanying text.
41. Perhaps the most egregious example of Treasury delay is Zenith itself, which required
almost six years to progress from the filing of the initial complaint (April 1970) to the final
negative countervailing duty determination (January 1976). While testifying before the House
Committee on Ways and Means on the proposed amendments to the countervailing duty law,
one of the American manufacturers that filed a complaint in Zenith stated:
The Zenith case represents an outrageous disregard of the Congressional mandate.
Zenith first filed its countervailing duty complaint in April 1970. Incorporated into
that complaint was a comprehensive report from the American Embassy in Tokyo
detailing an extensive list of Japanese export subsidy practices. For approximately two
years Treasury failed to conduct even a cursory investigation-while thousands of
American workers in the electronics industry lost their jobs as domestic production
rapidly declined. At the same time, our balance of trade with Japan went from bad to
worse.
In the Spring of 1972, the Magnavox Company and several U.S. electronic parts
producers also filed a countervailing duty complaint Japanese subsidy practices [sic].
Treasury finally initiated an investigation, but that investigation has since languished
and no action has been taken to offset the subsidy element contained in imports of
Japanese television sets.
Trade Reform: Hearings on HRA 6767 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. 3292-93 (1973) (statement of Magnavox Company). See also id. at 806.
42. 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
43. Tariff Act of 1930, § 516(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1516(b) (1976).
44. 440 F.2d at 1030.
45. Id.
1978]
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that Congress had chosen to rely on the executive branch, rather than on
the judiciary, to determine when to impose countervailing duties.
The Hammond Lead decision had the effect of "legitimiz[ing] prevailing
administrative practice ' 46 by insulating it from judicial scrutiny. The com-
bination of administrative discretion and judicial restraint drastically re-
duced the utility of section 303 to American manufacturers seeking
protection from subsidized foreign goods.47 Congress recognized that Ham-
mond Lead "might adversely affect the ability of American producers to
obtain meaningful relief under the countervailing duty law."48 In order to
"balance" Treasury discretion with the need to protect domestic interests
from subsidized imports,49 Congress expressly overturned Hammond Lead
in the Trade Act of 1974 by providing for judicial review of negative coun-
tervailing duty determinations.
II
THE ZENITH CASE
Against this background, Zenith Radio Corporation, an American manu-
facturer of electronic products, filed a complaint in 1970 with the Commis-
sioner of Customs,50 alleging that the Japanese Government was paying
bounties or grants on the export of certain electronic products5' to the
United States. Zenith charged inter alia that Japanese electronics exporters
were receiving remittances of a Japanese Commodity Tax-an excise tax of
between five and forty percent imposed on Japanese goods consumed do-
mestically but remitted on exported products.52 Accordingly, Zenith de-
46. Comment, supra note 1, at 845.
47. See 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 277, 279 (1972); Recent Decision, Hammond Lead Products, Inc.
v. United States: A Step Away From Protection For the Domestic Manufacturer?, 4 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 146, 155 (1972).
48. H.R. REP. No. 93-571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1973).
49. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONO.
& An). NEws 7186, 7320, stated.
The amendments to the existing law adopted by the Committee are designed to
balance the need for assuring effective protection of domestic interests from foreign
subsidies, on the one hand, with the need to afford some flexibility in the application
of the United States' law which is essential for achieving a negotiated international
agreement to the problems arising from the use of subsidies and imposition of counter-
vailing duties.
50. The complaint was filed pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 16.24(b) (1970) (currently appearing at
19 C.F.R. § 159.47(b) (1977)).
51. These products were: television receivers, various parts of television receivers, radio re-
ceivers, radio-phonograph combinations, radio-television-phonograph combinations, ra-
dio/tape recorder combinations, tape players, record players and phonographs complete with
amplifiers and speakers, and tape recorders. Notice of Countervailing Duty Proceedings, 37
Fed. Reg. 10,087 (1972), as amended by 37 Fed. Reg. 11,487 (1972).
52. TAX BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FINANCE (Japan), AN OUTLINE OF JAPANESE TAxEs, 119-
23 (1970).
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phasizing that, in that case, the Russian scheme was composed of at least
two inseparable elements: the remission of the excise tax and a transferable
certificate of substantial market value. Thus, in the CCPA's view, any dis-
cussion in Downs concerning the remission alone was outside the scope of
the Supreme Court's inquiry;63 the passages in Downs relied upon by the
Customs Court were not controlling, since they could not be read "as
though they were divorced from all preceding and succeeding discussion, or
as establishing a proposition of law to govern a fact (tax remission alone)
not before the Court."'64 This argument was specifically challenged in a dis-
senting opinion in Zenith.65 The dissent correctly pointed out that the
Supreme Court in Downs might plausibly have considered either of the two
elements alone to have constituted a bounty-that the Court's decision may
have rested on two alternative grounds of equal validity.66
The majority, however, after disposing of Downs, was able to view
Zenith as a case of first impression. The court examined the statutory lan-
guage of section 303, finding that it delegates broad discretion to the Trea-
sury in the undefined phrase "bounty or grant." 67 The legislative history of
the statute gives no indication of congressional intent on the meaning of
this phrase, thus providing no guidance for the court.68 With no case law to
the contrary, a broad statute, and a silent legislative history, the CCPA's
only "remaining tool in the decision-making inventory" was the longstand-
ing Treasury interpretation. 69
III
THE CCPA'S TREATMENT OF THE TREASURY
PRACTICE
In the absence of any legal precedent on the issue, it is certainly not sur-
prising or improper that the CCPA in Zenith gave special consideration to
the longstanding Treasury practice. It is troublesome, however, that the
court gave conclusive weight to this practice while refusing to analyze or
justify it. The opinion correctly establishes that no legal basis exists for
compelling the imposition of countervailing duties as a matter of law, as
was urged by Zenith. But the opinion fails to establish that tax remissions
63. 562 F.2d at 1213.
64. Id. at 1215.
65. Id. at 1223 (dissenting opinion).
66. Id. at 1228.
67. The court said about this issue: "Congress' intent to provide a wide latitude, within
which the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) may determine the existence or non-existence
of a bounty or grant, is clear from the statute itself, and from the congressional refusal to
define the words 'bounty,' 'grant,' or 'net amount,' in the statute or anywhere else, for almost
80 years." 562 F.2d at 1216.
68. See id. at 1216-18.
69. Id. at 1223.
CO UNTER VAILING DUTIES
manded that the Treasury impose countervailing duties pursuant to section
303.
The Commissioner of Customs ordered an investigation 53 of Zenith's al-
legations,54 which resulted in a determination that the Japanese Govern-
ment had paid no bounty or grant, or that any bounty or grant paid was de
minimis.55 According to the Treasury, remission of the Commodity Tax did
not incur countervailing duty liability under section 303, since the tax was
imposed directly on the electronic products.
The Department's negative determination in Zenith presented the first
opportunity for an American manufacturer to employ the provisions of the
Trade Act of 1974 granting judicial review of negative countervailing duty
determinations. 56 In the Customs Court, Zenith moved for summary judg-
ment, asking the court to rule as a matter of law that remission of the Japa-
nese Commodity Tax was a bounty or grant within the scope of section
303.5 7 Relying heavily on the broad tax remission language in Downs,58 the
Customs Court held that the remission constituted a bounty or grant as a
matter of law. The court thus overruled the Treasury's longstanding inter-
pretation of section 303, holding that the Department's interpretation con-
flicted with the Supreme Court's construction of the statute.59
On appeal, the CCPA reversed the decision of the Customs Court60 and
reinstated the Treasury determination, granting summary judgment in
favor of the Government.61 The broad language in Downs, indicating that
the remission of any excise tax is per se a bounty or grant,62 posed the most
serious problem for the CCPA. But the court disposed of Downs by em-
53. The Commissioner of Customs has the authority to order an investigation pursuant to
19 C.F.R. § 16.24(d) (1970) (currently appearing at 19 C.F.R. § 159A7(c) (1977)).
54. See Notice of Countervailing Duty Proceedings, supra note 51.
55. The Notice of Preliminary Determination, 40 Fed. Reg. 5378 (1975), listed three pro-
grams found to constitute de minimis bounties or grants under § 303: (1) preferential interest
rate loans from the Japanese Development Bank, (2) promotional assistance from the Japan
External Trade Organization (JETRO), and (3) tax deferrals under the Overseas Market De-
velopment Reserves (only tentatively found to be de minimis). In an amendment to the No-
tice of Preliminary Determination, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,853 (1975), Customs announced that other
programs alleged in Zenith's complaint were found not to constitute bounties or grants. The
Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination appears at 41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976).
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d), also applies to negative Treasury determinations of sales at less
than fair value under the Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-173 (1976). See SCM Corp. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 549 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1977), for a discussion of the
review of negative determinations of injury under the antidumping law by the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission.
57. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242, 243 (Cust. Ct.), rev'd, 562 F.2d
1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
58. 430 F. Supp. at 244-45. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
59. 430 F. Supp. at 249.
60. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
61. Id. at 1223.
62. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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as a matter of law cannot be countervailed-a finding necessary for sum-
mary judgment to lie in favor of the Government. Rather, the court seems
to have acquiesced in the Treasury's interpretation of section 303 simply
because it is the Treasury's interpretation, not because it is the correct, or
even a reasonable, application of the law.
Such summary review does not comport with the congressional purpose
in enacting section 516(d).70 The section's legislative history indicates that
Congress clearly intended to create a judicial check on Treasury discretion
in making countervailing duty determinations. The Zenith decision does
not evince a willingness on the part of the CCPA to implement the "bal-
ance" sought by Congress.71 Yet the court's own past approach to review of
affirmative countervailing duty orders suggests that it considers some exam-
ination of the Treasury's interpretations of section 303 an essential part of
its review function. Although the court has not consistently articulated a
standard of review, some measure of review has been available. For exam-
ple, in Energetic Worsted Co. v. United States72 the Customs Court applied
the arbitrary and capricious standard to uphold the method by which the
Treasury had calculated a bounty or grant.73 On appeal, the CCPA em-
ployed the substantial evidence test to reverse the Customs Court and the
Treasury determination. 74
Another approach taken by the CCPA in past cases has been to evaluate
the Treasury's interpretation of section 303 in light of international practice.
In American Express Co. v. United States,75 the court cited a decision of the
European Economic Community (EEC) Court of Justice and a GATT
Working Party Report in support of the Treasury's position.76 These cases
are significant not because they demonstrate that one or the other of these
standards should apply in every case, but because they show that at least
some standard has traditionally been available by which to review Treasury
determinations. Prior to Zenith, the CCPA had never refused completely
to review a Treasury countervailing duty determination under section 303.
Of course, more exhaustive treatment by the court, as urged here, would not
necessarily require reversal of the Treasury determination in this or other
cases. In fact, throughout the history of section 303, only one counter-
70. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 49 supra.
72. 224 F. Supp. 606 (Cust. Ct. 1963), rev'd, 53 C.C.P.A. 36 (1966).
73. 224 F. Supp. at 615.
74. 53 C.C.P.A. at 42, 45-46.
75. 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
76. Id. at 1059-60. In Zenith, the court could easily have cited significant international
support for the Treasury determination, since the Treasury's interpretation is consistent with
the GATT rule. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, further support
for the Treasury rule exists in current economic theory. See, e.g., Barcel6, Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties-.4nalysis and a Proposal, 9 LAW & POL'Y INt'L Bus. 779, 813 (1977).
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vailing duty order has been overturned.7 7 The problem in Zenith lies in the
court's approach, rather than in the outcome of the case.
A major objection to the court's deference to the Treasury Department is
that it exacerbates Treasury secrecy, already a hindrance to the attempts of
private interests to understand and implement the countervailing duty stat-
ute.7 8 Judicial challenge has traditionally been the most effective means of
forcing the Treasury to defend and justify its interpretation of the statute,
since litigation usually necessitates disclosure of the facts collected during
the investigation and the methods used in determining the payment of a
bounty or grant. Without the "elucidation" provided by judicial analysis of
Treasury policy, Treasury silence may become complete.
7 9
The CCPA in Zenith offered several arguments to support its deference
to the Treasury. The court began by explaining that judicial review of the
Treasury practice on its merits would usurp a duty of Congress, violating
the separation of powers doctrine.80 The court also expressed concern that
changing the Treasury ruling would involve so many complex economic
issues, as well as other nonjudicial problems, "that it is fit that the Judiciary
recuse itself.' 8 1
Further, the court noted that an unpredictable judicial reaction to the
Treasury determination would have unsettling effects on world trade.82 The
force of this argument is reduced somewhat by the Trade Act of 1974,
which delegated to the Treasury the discretion to waive the imposition of
countervailing duties under certain conditions.8 3 Nonetheless, Zenith
caused concern both in the Carter Administration8 4 and at the GATT nego-
77. Energetic Worsted Co. v. United States, 53 C.C.P.A. 36 (1963).
78. See notes 11-21 supra and accompanying text.
79. Comment, supra note 1, at 864. American Express Co. v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050
(C.C.P.A. 1973), illustrates how Treasury data and methods are revealed by litigation.
80. 562 F.2d at 1221-22 n.30. Although the court does not cite specific constitutional provi-
sions showing that the problems here discussed fall more properly within the competence of
other branches of government, they are presumably (I) Congress power to collect duties and
regulate commerce with foreign nations, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, and (2) the Executive's power
to conduct foreign policy, id. art. II, § 2.
81. 562 F.2d at 1223. This phrase is borrowed from a majority opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas in Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 79 (1974).
82. 562 F.2d at 1221 n.27.
83. The Trade Act granted the Treasury discretion to suspend imposition of countervailing
duties even where a bounty or grant had been found to exist. In order for suspension of the
countervailing duty to be authorized, three conditions must exist: (1) steps must have been
taken to reduce the adverse effects of the bounty or grant, (2) there must be a reasonable
prospect of a new trade agreement, and (3) imposition of countervailing duties must be likely
to jeopardize the successful completion of the trade negotiations. 19 U.SC. § 1303(d)(2)
(1976). This power of suspension has been exercised frequently by the Treasury. See, e.g.,
Cheese from Austria, T.D. 76-11, 10 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 3, at 29, 41 Fed. Reg. 1275 (1976);
Canned Hams from EEC, T.D. 75-301, 9 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 50, at 11, 40 Fed. Reg. 55,639
(1975).
84. After the decision in the Customs Court, the Wall Street Journal quoted Robert Strauss,
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tiations in Geneva85 because of its potentially wide-ranging adverse effects
on world trade. This concern continues to exist at least in part because of a
similar and even more portentous case now pending before the Customs
Court, involving an American steel manufacturer's challenge of remission
of the EEC's Value Added Tax.8
6
Overzealous court review of negative Treasury determinations could
have the further detrimental effect of overcrowding the courts, as was elo-
quently noted by the CCPA in Zenith.87 While this and other arguments of
the court might apply with some force to whether courts should exercise de
novo judicial review of Treasury determinations, they do not necessarily
justify denial of review by some other, less rigorous standard-for example,
the reasonableness of the Treasury practice. But the Zenith court refused to
scrutinize the Treasury determination even to that extent.88 At one point in
its opinion, the court implied that since the Treasury is not required to pub-
lish hearings and hearing records of its investigations, the entire process is
thereby rendered completely unreviewable.89 Even disregarding the section
516(d) review provision, this argument is fallacious for at least two reasons.
First, review of a matter of law, such as the inclusion of excise tax remis-
sions under the phrase "bounty or grant" in section 303, would not neces-
sarily entail review of factual findings. The court could review the
Treasury's interpretation of section 303 by substituting its legal judgment in
construing "bounty or grant," or it could review the determination accord-
ing to some less rigorous standard.90 Neither of these alternatives would
require a complete review of factual findings.
Second, lack of a hearing record normally would not completely preclude
Carter Administration Trade Specialist, as saying, "'There isn't any way I can overstate the
potential for destruction' of the trading system posed by the Zenith case." Wall St. J., June 24,
1977, at 2, col. 3.
85. See, e.g., Wall St. J., June 6, 1977, at 6, coL 2, which stated: "A working party of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade expressed 'serious concern' over the recent United
States Customs Court decision to impose countervailing duties on imported Japanese elec-
tronic goods. It referred the matter to the GATI council, requesting 'urgent action."'
86. See United States Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 76-2-00456 (Cust. Ct., filed Feb. 18,
1976). Asserting that the VAT rebate is legally indistinguishable from the rebate of the Japa-
nese Commodity Tax, United States Steel moved for summary judgment in the Customs Court
following the Customs Court's decision in Zenith. Robert Strauss viewed the action as
"threatening to the whole world trade system." Wall St. J., June 14, 1977, at 14, col. 3.
87. The court said. "The growing tendency of those who fail in their objective before the
Congress to thereafter submit the same plea to the undermanned federal courts is one factor
contributing to the current appellate flood, which threatens to drown justice in the thrashings
of a litigious sea." 562 F.2d at 1221 n.26.
88. "The United States cites the reasonableness of its practice and numerous cases setting
forth guidelines for judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act.
We are not, however, reviewing a record under that Act in this case." Id. at 1220 n.21.
89. Id. at 1216 n.13.
90. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 30.00 (1976).
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the review of administrative factual determinations. 91 Although some disa-
greement exists as to what the standard of review should be, it is clear that
lack of a hearing record does not free an agency from all judicial control.92
Moreover, although the statute and the Treasury regulations do not require
hearings on a Treasury determination to impose countervailing duties, past
judicial scrutiny of affirmative orders has often included a thorough review
of the complete Treasury investigatory record.93 The enactment of section
516(dy added nothing to indicate that the standard of review is less stringent
in the case of negative determinations. 94 Thus, the court's suggestion that
lack of a hearing record precludes review of Treasury determinations ap-
pears to be without foundation.
IV
RECOMMENDATIONS
In the aftermath of Zenith, American manufacturers may justifiably feel
that their right to judicial review of negative countervailing duty determina-
tions has been thwarted by the CCPA. But several alternative approaches
remain available which may help resolve not only the problems created by
the decision, but also the general issue of countervailing duty assessment.
First, Zenith petitioned for a writ of certiorari which has been granted by
the Supreme Court.95 The decision to hear Zenith may indicate that the
Court is concerned over the extreme deference given to the Treasury by the
CCPA. If so, the Court has several options for the disposition of the case.
For instance, the Court could remand the case to the Customs Court for
further development of the facts or for an examination of the disputed
Treasury interpretation of section 303. Alternatively, the Court could up-
hold the Treasury interpretation on the basis of its reasonableness 96 or
some related standard,97 possibly relying for support on international prac-
tice as embodied in the GATT.
98
91. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See
generally K. DAvIs, supra note 90, at § 29.01-.08.
92. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965), holding
that, in the absence of a hearing record at the administrative level, the district court should
hold a trial de novo to determine if the facts were properly established.
93. See, ag., Energetic Worsted Co. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 606 (Cust. Ct. 1963),
rev'd, 53 C.C.P.A. 36 (1966).
94. See Remarks by Stewart, supra note 21.
95. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1978) (No. 77-539).
96. The CCPA in Zenith expressly refused to evaluate even the reasonableness of the Trea-
sury practice. See 562 F.2d at 1220 n.21; note 88 supra and accompanying text.
97. The lower courts have not applied a uniform standard of review to Treasury orders and
determinations. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
98. GATT, supra note 25, art. VI(3). See also notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
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The Court may, however, venture into the complex economic issues
presented by the case. If the Court decides to overturn the Treasury deter-
mination, it may resurrect the broad construction of "bounty or grant"
which appears in Downs.99 A final possibility is that the Court will formu-
late its own independent construction of the statutory phrase in either af-
firming or reversing the CCPA. The likelihood of a new Supreme Court
construction of "bounty or grant" is diminished, however, in light of the
Tokyo Round of international trade negotiations currently in progress in
Geneva.1°° These negotiations will probably result in a comprehensive in-
ternational solution to the general problem of subsidies and countervailing
duties, including revision of the American countervailing duty law. 101 The
Justice Department has already expressed concern that the mere decision to
grant certiorari in Zenith may cause "uncertainty" in the U.S. Govern-
ment's bargaining position in these negotiations.10 2 It is unlikely that the
Supreme Court will further complicate the issues involved by articulating
new standards under the existing American law.
A second possible approach to resolution of the countervailing duties
controversy is for American manufacturers to urge congressional reform of
the countervailing duty statute. 103 But Congress may be unwilling to act
while Zenith is before the Supreme Court or while international negotia-
tions are in progress. Assuming that the Tokyo Round negotiations will be
successful in establishing acceptable and timely standards for regulating
subsidies generally, the best alternative is probably to wait for the results of
those negotiations. But in the event that international negotiations fail to
produce acceptable results, Congress should act immediately to ensure the
establishment of the "balance" between Treasury discretion and the inter-
ests of American industry which it intended to establish in the Trade Act of
1974.104
Past decisions of the CCPA have invoked international practice to support the Treasury inter-
pretation of § 303. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
99. The Downs case is discussed at notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
100. The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2131(a) (1976), authorizes the United States to
enter into these negotiations. See generally Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating NontarffDistor-
tions to Trade, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 327 (1975).
101. For a recent status report on the subsidy and countervailing duty aspects of the negoti-
ations, see SUBCOMM. ON TRADE, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 94TH CONG., IST SaSS.,
BACKGROUND AND STATUS OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS Supp. I, 13-14
(Comm. Print 1975).
102. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1978, at 55, col. I.
103. An amendment to the statute specifically providing for disclosure by the Treasury of its
reasoning in countervailing duty determinations is desirable. See Butler, supra note 3, at 144.
Also, American manufacturers have long sought to have Congress define the phrase "bounty
or grant" by expressly enumerating the practices which would incur countervailing duty liabil-
ity. See, e.g., Trade Refornv Hearings on H.A 6767 Before the House Comn on Ways and
Means, supra note 41, at 2171.
104. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
By its failure to evaluate the Treasury practice not to countervail excise
tax remission under section 303, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
in Zenith has abdicated its congressionally mandated responsibility effec-
tively to review negative countervailing duty determinations. Moreover,
although the court may be justified in refusing to grant de novo review of
Treasury determinations, the court's own prior practice and administrative
law principles governing review of agency action require some measure of
judicial review. The court's approach has further insulated Treasury pol-
icy from public analysis and, indeed, casts serious doubt upon the availabil-
ity under section 516(d) of meaningful judicial review.
David A. Churchill
As this Note went to press, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its deci-
sion in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978). The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the CCPA, but based its decision
upon a much more careful review of the disputed Treasury practice of not
countervailing against nonexcessive excise tax remissions. Citing the legisla-
tive history of section 303, successive reenactments of the statute by Con-
gress, consistent economic theory, and the international practice of the
GATT, the Court found that the Treasury practice was "'sufficiently rea-
sonable' to be accepted by a reviewing court." The Court was not per-
suaded by Downs, concluding that the "isolated statement" in that case
could not overcome the longstanding and uniform Treasury practice. This
outcome in the Zenith litigation now paves the way for international reso-
lution of the countervailing duty issue by the Tokyo Round of trade negoti-
ations.
